Cognitive artifacts as a window on design  by Carroll, John M. et al.
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectJournal of Visual Languages and Computing
Journal of Visual Languages and Computing 24 (2013) 248–2611045-92
http://d
☆ This
n Corr
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jvlcCognitive artifacts as a window on design$
John M. Carroll n, Marcela Borge, Shin-I Shih
Center for Human–Computer Interaction, College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University,
University Park, PA 16802, USAa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 10 November 2012
Received in revised form
4 February 2013
Accepted 5 May 2013
Available online 14 May 2013
Keywords:
Information analysis
Information artifacts
Design of interactive systems6X & 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsev
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jvlc.2013.05.001
paper has been recommended for acceptan
esponding author. Tel.: +1 814 8632476; fax
ail address: jmcarroll@psu.edu (J.M. Carroll).a b s t r a c t
We are investigating information analysis as a kind of problem solving in which teams are
presented with a collection of facts regarding people, places and events, and then identify
underlying connections, patterns, and plans in order to draw specific conclusions. The teams
spontaneously created a variety of artifacts to hold and organize problem information, and
practices to simplify and regularize their collaborative interactions around these artifacts. In this
paper, we analyze the artifacts and practices as a potential source of insight into how this
problem solving activity could be supported by an interactive system design.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
When people work in complex environments, they sup-
port their own intellectual activity by designing artifacts to
hold and organize problem domain information and practices
to simplify and regularize interactions. For example, people
create descriptive names for their personal files and, in
managing file systems, they develop file naming schemas to
guide and facilitate the generation of new filenames, and to
enhance subsequent retrieval and recognition interactions
with files and filenames [5]. This is a simple example of
distributed cognition: People creatively shape and leverage
the external world to be a more effective resource for their
own subsequent activity [22].
Spontaneous ad hoc designs are of course not necessa-
rily optimal designs, or even good designs. Non-designers
often inappropriately reuse existing designs [21]. Com-
mand languages that users designed to operate robots
were used effectively by those users, but the user-designed
command languages often incorporated linguisticier Ltd.
ce by S.-K. Chang.
: +1 814 8656426.
Open access under CC properties known to evoke command language perfor-
mance problems for people generally [5].
We are investigating information analysis as a kind of
problem solving in which teams are presented with a wide
array of information regarding people, places and events, and
must try to identify underlying connections, patterns, and
plans. This is a difficult area to work in because practitioners
are often specifically inaccessible to the public because of the
security classification of the problem content they address. In
a field study of information analysts in the US National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA, but at that time called
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) only a few
participants could be identified, each was only able to devote
a couple hours to the study, and all had to be interviewed by
proxy, since our team did not have appropriate security
clearance to talk to them [27].
We created a reference task [35] involving 222 facts
pertaining to a set of campus crimes involving stolen laptop
computers. We observed teams of three students working to
identify suspects, to develop theories of the crimes, and to
predict the next likely crime in the series. In addition to
problem information, we provided the teams with standard
office supplies. Most teams used these physical materials to
create ad hoc information artifacts in the course of working on
the problem.
In this paper, we describe the artifacts that were
spontaneously created, and then consider these ad hocBY-NC-ND license.
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blem solving activity. We use this analysis of the artifacts
and practices of the student teams to guide a requirements
analysis for the design of an interactive system to support
the information analysis task. This is analogous to our
earlier investigation of emergency management planning
[6,28], which we subsequently used to design and evaluate
interactive system support for that activity [18].
2. Background
A premise of our work is that studying the artifacts
people spontaneously create to support their own activity
can be a window into their cognitive and collaborative
process. This premise is informed and supported by bodies
of research in distributed cognition, which regards artifacts
people use in carrying out work activity as elements of the
overall cognitive system [22,25], in cultural psychology,
which regards the externalization of thought into the
material world as a core strategy for both coping with
complexity and for learning [16,33], and in experience
design/embodied interaction, which regard the materiality
of tools and other cognitive resources as critical to their
role in human activity [20,36].
Research in cognitive psychology argues that diagrams
and graphics are less expressive media than text, parti-
cularly with respect to abstractions and relationships,
making them easier to understand, often interpretations
can be perceived instead of deduced [24,31]. Self-gene-
rated external representations function as memory aides,
both with respect to the content represented and the
person's analysis and interpretation of it [19].
Chin et al. [14] studied five professional information
analysts working both individually and as a group. The
analysts first made simple annotations in their source
materials to highlight purported facts about people, places
and events, then they constructed various artifacts to hold
and present facts, and finally they tried to identify patterns
or connections among facts. The analysts had distinctive
and strong beliefs about the artifacts they created and
used, and while they believed they could achieve better
results by collaborating with others, they also said they
would not trust another analyst's artifacts, but would need
to review the original source material.
We want to analyze spontaneously created artifacts as a
way of gathering and developing implicit design require-
ments for technology support. Artifacts that people spon-
taneously generate might suggest or embody “natural”
ways of representing problem domain information, and
therefore might be worth considering as design starting
points or design metaphors. More specifically, observed
efficacies or difficulties that people experience in using
their spontaneous artifacts might suggest approaches to
elaborating those artifacts as digital tools [18].
Taking cognitive artifacts as a window on design has
known limitations. It is a situated approach, so the artifacts
generated in a given problem context may be strongly
bound to that context [17]. One way to address this is to try
to articulate artifact analyses at a “basic level” of generality
[26]. Another limitation is that artifacts spontaneously
generated by people may be suboptimal or even poorrepresentations created to support performance, but per-
haps undermining it [15]. One way to address this is to try
to link artifact designs with user experiences and perfor-
mance outcomes, that is to emphasize representational
factors that enhance performance and/or experience, but
to mitigate or eliminate those that diminish outcomes for
people [7]. For example Schafer et al. [28] showed that
maintaining awareness was a key problem for regional
emergency planners, which was confirmed and elaborated
in laboratory studies. Support for awareness was therefore
emphasized in the design of software tools, which indeed
did support better performance [18]. Finally, the artifacts
people spontaneously generate might function effectively
as tools for those people, but not necessarily as effective
tools for others; this is a version of the “generation effect”
[5].
3. Study design
Our task scenario is an analog of the US Navy's Special
Operations Reconnaissance (SOR; [34]) scenario in which
three information analysts collaboratively synthesize and
make sense of a complex information space of people,
locations and events. We remapped the scenario content
to concern a series of laptop thefts in and around a college
campus. This was to better leverage local knowledge of our
college student participants (e.g., regarding town and
campus geography), and to enhance their engagement in
the study.
Each team member was assigned a specialized role
with distinct responsibilities regarding information sources:
the Interview Analyst manages information obtained from
interviews with persons of interest (POIs) or witnesses;
the Records Analyst manages information from reports or
files, such as bank/credit transactions, class schedules,
police records, etc.; the Web Analyst manages information
from Facebook, Twitter, EBay, and other online resources.
The problem scenario includes 222 pieces of information,
or facts, about relevant people, locations, and events
regarding the crimes; the 222 facts were evenly distrib-
uted among the team members through role-specialized
intelligence documents. Participants had to read and
analyze these intelligence documents in order to identify
the 222 facts.
The mission was organized into three phases, with a
specific objective for each phase; the performance scoring
rubric is indicated in parentheses. Phase I introduced 105
facts, mainly regarding schedules and relationships of
POIs. In this phase, the teams were asked to narrow down
a list of 26 POIs to a list of the eight most likely suspects (8
points). Opportunity was the main factor for this phase:
proximity to the crime scene at the time of the theft.
In Phase II, teams were given 48 further facts. Partici-
pants were asked to identify thieves for each of four thefts
(4 points), the instigators of each theft (8 points), motives
for stealing the laptops (4 points), and whether there were
connections among the four thefts (1 point). For this
phase, solutions were determined by opportunity and
motive: the thieves were one of the eight most likely
suspects who either (1) were near the crime scene at the
time of the theft and had motive based on their social
Table 1
Schematic overview of the three study phases.
Phase I Phase II Phase III
Information presented 105 facts 48 facts 69 facts
Team objective: Identify 8 most likely suspects from
26 persons of interest
Identify prime suspects for each
of four thefts
Identify suspects for a future
crime
Focus of analysis: Opportunity (time, location) Means and motives Opportunity (time, location)
Time constraint: 50 min 45 min 30 min
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of the theft and had a relationship with someone else who
might had motive. The instigators were the POIs who had
motives and were related to someone near the crime scene
(means and motives).
In Phase III, teams received 69 further facts about five
POIs who are potentially related to a future theft: Partici-
pants were told that police had identified a potential
victim and four potential perpetrators, based on connec-
tions in the analyzed in the previous phases. Participants
had to identify schedule overlaps with the victim, and
correlate that with access of POIs to relevant map informa-
tion, to determine which suspect possessed a map with
the location of where the victim would be during the time
of the potential crime. (For further description of our
reference task, see [9]).
Teams worked under time constraints: each team had
50 min for Phase I, 45min for Phase II, and 30min for
Phase III. At the end of each task phase, team members
were to come to a joint decision and write down a
team recommendation or answer for that phase. Table 1
schematically overviews the study procedure.
4. Methods
Participants were 66 undergraduate students recruited
from a large northeastern university in the United States.
In exchange for their participation, each student earned
class credits or received cash. Average age of the partici-
pants was 21.3 years; 53% of the students were male. The
students represented diverse disciplines, with 28.8% from
Information Sciences & Technology, 12.1% from Psychology,
and the remaining students (59.1%) from 26 other majors,
such as Security and Risk Analysis (4.5%), Supply Chain
(3.0%), Mechanical Engineering (3.0%), Communication
Arts and Science (3.0%), Advertising (3.0%), and Anthro-
pology (3.0%). Information Science and Technology and
Psychology are themselves rather diverse curricula.
We treated academic major of the participants as a
random variable. Participants were randomly assigned to
22 three-member teams.
Upon arrival, each participant was randomly assigned
one of three analyst roles. Participants were told they
would play the criminal investigation role of an expert in a
specialized information analysis team, and were each
given a general Mission Statement and a Phase I Role
Document. The Mission Statement explained the crime
scenario and the team's overall objectives, as well as
background information on criminal investigation [1,13].
For example, teams were told to consider the motives,means, and opportunity of POIs. The Phase I Role Docu-
ment described that member's team role, including the
information sources to be managed by that role in the
collaborative activity. The balance of the Role Document
provided each of the three participants information per-
taining to the problem scenario that was specific to his/her
role. Participants were not permitted to exchange their
raw information, but were told that to be successful, teams
had to share information and make decisions together,
that each member of the team held important and unique
pieces of information, and that each member was respon-
sible for sharing particular pieces of information when
relevant. Phases II and III also were initiated by presenting
each team member with their Role Document.
A wide-angle video recorder with tabletop microphone
was set-up to capture the entirety of the lab portion of the
study, from the experimenter instructions to behaviors of
all team members as they completed each phase of the
scenario. At the end of each problem phase, teams were
given an intelligence update containing the correct analy-
sis and solution for that phase. Thus, each team entered
each succeeding phase with the same prior information
and analysis.
In order to contrast the characteristics of high and low
performing teams, we calculated each team's performance
scores for each phase (points obtained/points possible)
and selected from the 22 teams the five consistently
highest performing teams and the five consistently lowest
performing teams for further detailed analysis. In the
balance of this paper we describe and analyze data from
these ten teams.
Videos of team problem solving interactions for each of
the ten teams were transcribed. We employed interaction
analysis [23]. Each new speaker utterance and or behavior
was parsed as a new turn, and time-stamped. Turns were
split into dialogue acts, separate sentences. Nonverbal
gestures and events such as moving to the whiteboard,
nodding, using hands, and creating artifacts were indi-
cated in the transcript. Any time participants, used,
referred to, or wrote on one of their artifacts, this was
coded in the transcript. Research group discussions were
used to verify observations related to artifact use and
organize analysis.
5. Individual artifacts
Participants – individually and collaboratively – created
a variety of information artifacts as they studied, orga-
nized, analyzed, and draw conclusions from the scenario.
We classified the artifacts created into six types: text anno-
Table 2
Distribution of individual and team artifacts into six categories
Individual artifacts Team artifacts
Text annotation 46 2
Calendar annotation 6 2
Map/geo-spatial annotation 2 1
List 43 15
Table 9 10
Graphical representation 2 5
Total 108 35
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lists, tables, and graphical representations. Text annotations
were notes or highlighting inscribed directly on problem
documents. For example, many teams wrote on the intelli-
gence updates given to them at the end of each scenario
phase with final police reports presenting the correct
interim analysis for the crime. Calendar annotations were
monthly/weekly calendar/planner photocopies that parti-
cipants wrote annotations on. Map/geo-spatial annotations
were artifacts that used a provided paper map of the
campus as a foundation for further annotations. Lists were
one-dimensional text-based representations, for example,
an enumeration of motives, or of information relevant to a
particular crime date. Tableswere two-dimensional textual
representations, a row by column format, in which the
majority of information in the cells was textual or numeric
(i.e., little to no graphical illustration). For example, a list of
suspect rows, crossed by a series of crime date columns,
with each cell indicating whether that particular suspect
was near a crime scene on that date. Graphical representa-
tions were composite artifacts, such as calendars with
embedded tables, and non-orthogonal illustrations, such
as social network graphs.
Some of the information artifacts created by partici-
pants were never shared among team members. These
individual artifacts were created and used by only a single
member of a team. In total, 108 individual artifacts were
created across the 30 members of the 10 teams; 29
participants created at least one. The individual informa-
tion artifacts tended to be relatively simple: There were 46
text annotations (44 made to intelligence documents and
two made to mission statements) and 43 lists versus six
calendar annotations, two geospatial annotations, nine
tables, and two graphical representations (see Table 2).
They tended more to be created early in the problem-
solving scenario: 55 in Phase I, 27 in Phase II, and 24 in
Phase III.
Because the creation and use of these artifacts was
inscribed in the activity of a single participant, they left
few traces in the video and transcription data. As far as we
can tell, these artifacts were created as participants read
through problem documents, or as they listened to other
team members speak, as personal note taking. For exam-
ple, 28 of the 43 lists (65%) were names of and information
pertaining to persons of interest (POI). These lists were
somewhat opportunistic; names appeared in their order of
occurrence in the problem documents, and with a wide
variety of associated information, including no associated
information. In some cases, it appeared that the partici-
pant's strategy for creating the artifact had changed part
way through its creation; for example, names early in the
list included associated information, but names later in the
list did not.
Another typical sort of list we identified was one
enumerating all of the POIs on one page, but with no
associated information. Half of these lists included high-
lighting or names crossed out, perhaps to help the parti-
cipant keep track of which suspects had been discussed or
eliminated during the course of the team discussion.
Fig. 1A illustrates a list artifact of this type. Fig. 1B is an
example of a text annotation artifact; in this case, aRecords Analyst used color-coded highlighting to associate
suspicious account transactions with crime dates.
The individual artifacts suggest that team members
focused on concrete details versus overall framing infor-
mation. Twenty-five out of the 30 participants (more than
82%) made annotations to the intelligence documents that
contained information about the victims and persons of
interest. In contrast, only two out of the 30 participants
(less than 7%) made annotations to the mission briefing
document that contained information about the problem
as a whole, i.e., task goals, verifiability of information, total
number of persons of interest, and objectives of the
information analysis activity.
6. Team artifacts
The key distinction between individual artifacts and
team artifacts is that the latter, but not the former, were
used collaboratively, that is, shared among team members.
The majority of team artifacts (27/35, or 77.1%) were
created as a means to integrate information provided by
more than one team member for the team.
All of the team artifacts were created, or at least
initiated by a single team member. Unlike individual
artifacts, the creation of team artifacts was always pre-
ceded by some public behavior, though in most cases this
was quite limited, often a single utterance, in which the
artifact creator reflected on types of information held by
different team members and/or types and relationships in
information that might help the team develop its analysis.
For example, immediately before creating a relationship
diagram (see Fig. 6), a Web Analyst (team 2) stated, “So we
need what? Motive, who the thieves are, why they did it,
and possible connections?” Typically, this initial interac-
tion regarding team artifacts was essentially just a notifi-
cation; the artifact creator moved ahead without waiting
for a response from the other team members.
The initial planning appeared to function as a public
analysis framing which the artifact itself embodied. Team
artifacts were also somewhat more refined than individual
artifacts. In another example, a team was discussing the
concept of opportunity. One member embodied part of the
discussion as a person by crime date matrix, with an
alphabetical list of POIs as the ordinate, the four crime
dates as the abscissa. Each cell of the matrix analyzed the
opportunity of a given POI to commit a given crime. This
design is quite refined and also quite simple (see Fig. 2C);
it was very useful to the team in collating and information
Fig. 2. Artifacts created by three teams in phase I of the task scenario. Example A is a list created by team 17; example B is a list created by team 7; example
C is a table created by team 2.
Fig. 1. Individual artifacts (A) (left) is a set of lists enumerating POIs (B) (right) is color-coded text annotations to associate suspicious transactions with
crime dates. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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discussion and identifying questions they needed to
address, and for developing further team artifacts.
In contrast to the individual artifacts, which tended to
be created early in the problem scenario (more than half
were created in Phase I), team artifacts tended to be
created later in the activity: 9 in Phase I, 13 in Phase II,
and 13 in Phase III. The maximum number of shared
artifacts created by any team was 9 (team 8). Most teams
created multiple artifacts; three teams (1, 14, and 15)
created a single artifact. Overall, there were two text
annotations, both made to intelligence updates, highlight-
ing the correct answers for a previous phase, two calendar
annotations, one geospatial annotation, 15 lists, ten tables,
and five graphical representations (refer to Table 2).
Team artifacts tended to be more complex: where half
of the individual artifacts were direct annotations of
problem materials, only 5 of 35 team artifacts were
annotations; conversely, where only 10% of the individualartifacts were tables or graphical representations, for team
artifacts this proportion was greater than 40%.
As for the individual artifacts, the team artifacts focused
on organizing and emphasizing problem content versus
overall problem framing information. Only one team anno-
tated (highlighted) a critical piece of information in the
mission briefing regarding the reliability of POI information.
Because the team artifacts involved some public plan-
ning (albeit limited) and collaborative interaction as they
were used, we were better able to track and analyze when
and how they were created and used in video recordings
and transcripts. In the next few sections we focus on the
team artifacts.
7. Artifact categories
The most typical team artifacts were lists and tables.
Teams used lists to represent information related to
specific crime dates or motives. Examples A and B in
Fig. 3. A relationship diagram developed by team 18 using post-it notes.
Fig. 4. Team 21 used written annotations and two types of colored post-
its on a campus map. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 5. Diagram developed by team 2 in phase 3 of the scenario
to compare schedules across five suspects.
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the information the team had about all persons of interest
(POIs), including where the POIs were, and relationships
among POIs (coded by color). Example B is a filtered list, in
this case enumerating only the POIs whose locations gave
them an opportunity to commit the crime.
Example C is an example of an elimination table with
POIs listed as rows and crime dates as columns. Team 2
inscribed a question mark in a corresponding cell if the
given POI had opportunity to commit the crime and an X if
he/she did not. This is a highly refined artifact, abstracting
the narrative details of specific POIs with regards to their
proximity and availability during crime events.
Graphical representations are of interest because they
are more complex and often more refined. One team (18)
devised a paper artifact that afforded editing (see Fig. 3).
This artifact employed post-it notes labeled with the
names of POIs, and clustered into affinity groups based
on the degree of interpersonal relationships between
individuals. This approach provided dynamic flexibility:
the post-its could be moved around to reflect further
information and analysis. Also, key facts associated with
individuals could be written directly onto their corre-
sponding post-it. The team used light green post-its to
label characteristics of clustered POI post-its. Fig. 3 illus-
trates some of the boundary conditions and limitations of
this artifact: Some post-its covered others, thus the relat-
edness of two post-its is depicted by occluding informa-
tion that could be important. Although the POI names are
written in large bold lettering, once the post-its have been
grouped, it can be difficult to retrieve information by POI
name (versus, say, an alphabetical list).
Team 21 devised a grpahical artifact incorporating geo-
spatial annotation and two kinds of color-coded post-its
on a campus map (Fig. 4). This map was used to depict
where people were during each of the crimes, and if they
were close enough to commit the crimes. The blue post-its
highlight the four crime locations, each labeled in a unique
color of ink. The pink post-its indicate the location of
various POIs, with the color of ink indicating which of the
four crimes they most likely committed. This artifact was
created by the team to visually integrate information theyhad already collated in a simpler list artifact: suspect
names, locations, and crime dates. The team wanted to
look at the distance between locations to more directly
search for patterns of connection among suspects. One
problem they seemed to encounter was extending the
color coding of the four crime locations to color coding of
the POIs. The main problem they experienced is that they
used color coding as a means to highlight too many
different things and found it difficult to consistently apply
the color coding rules. They followed an abstraction
approach to creating the diagram by converting a great
deal of textual information into abstract representations
(i.e. color codes, stars, “I” for instigator) and then pro-
ceeded to add more and more of these these types of
represenations to the artifacts.
During Phase III, Team 2 created a composite calendar
diagram incorporating the weekly schedules of the five
people they were considering—four suspects and the likely
next victim (see Fig. 5). This artifact was based on an
individual artifact created by the Record Analyst. She
suggested developing a comprehensive version incorpor-
ating everyone's schedules, and began by placing a large
piece of paper on the table and writing the days of the
week in black marker accross the top of it. One of her
teammates then began to read off his schedule informa-
tion, but the third member interrupted to suggest that
they use different colored pens to code the schedules of
each of the five people. As they worked, the team elabo-
rated their approach to the artifact to address various
issues. For example, they began by color coding the line
segments representing spans of time corresponding to
Table 3
Interaction excerpt: team 18 re-identifying the rationale for including George in a decision table.
Record Analyst: We put George in at Thursday. Why?
Web Analyst: Any reason why?
Interview Analyst: Yeah He has a doctor's appointment, which is right next to [ the Career Center …
Records Analyst: We have nothing else that can place him in any other. And thirty minutes before that it happened. The appointment is.]
Web Analyst: Yeah, fine, fine. I get it.
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location information. Accordingly, they inserted abbre-
viated place name for each schedule event. They also
began with the strategy of sharing all schedule informa-
tion for all POIs, but then realized that they only needed to
identify schedule overlaps with the potential victim's
schedule. Consequently, they focused on representing the
victim's schedule information, and filtering other schedule
information depending on whether it overlaped with the
victim. Finally, as they started to run short of time, they
recognized the inefficiency of having one scribe, and
shifted to adding information to the artifact simulta-
neously. This artifact is very appropriate for Phase III.
Although it like other evolving artifacts, it ended up
somewhat cluttered, it provided a prompting framework
that elicited all the relevant information from the team.
8. Grounding artifacts
All categories of artifacts externalized information from
the various intelligence documents presented to members
of the teams. They summarized and integrated problem
information, and facilitated sharing and pooling informa-
tion with fellow team members. However, creating arti-
facts also removed problem information from its original
context—the intelligence documents. To some extent, the
collaborative team work helped to provide grounding for
information in the artifacts. For example, as someone's
name, or a short summary of a fact about someone, was
inscribed in a list or other artifact, one of the team
members might state the rationale for including that
person or that fact, as suggested in the descriptions of
Figs. 2–5. This is a simple example of fixing reference [5] in
which the speech context that accompanies a baptismal
use of a linguistic expression is evoked in successive uses
of that expression.
Fixing reference is a logical–historical relationship that
is often undermined by the limitations of human memory
and attention. People can baptise an expression, but then
quickly forget what it referred to. Our participants often
realized they could not quite recall why a particular name
or fact appeared in an artifact, and had to engage in
explicit grounding work in which they redeveloped the
rationale, as illustrated in Table 3.
The team had already gone through this rationale when
they initially included George in the decision table. But as
they began to use the table and make their decisions, two
of the three members had forgotten the original rationale.
This grounding process, or in this case re-grounding, can
be seen as a cost of artifact abstraction: The rationale for
including George did not itself appear in the artifact,
indeed were all of the possibly relevant context andrationale explicitly included the value of the artifact as a
summary representation would be compromised by addi-
tional visual complexity and clutter.
The re-grounding process can also be seen as a poten-
tially useful process in that it motivates re-examination of
the original rationale, which could have been flawed (as
well as being forgotten).
9. Artifact strategies
We identified strategies in the creation and use of
artifacts by examining videotapes and transcripts of epi-
sodes. We drew a distinction between accretion and
filtering strategies. Accretion is successively adding infor-
mation into an artifact. The artifact collates and presents
problem information more densely, abstracting the infor-
mation from the original context of the intelligence docu-
ments provided in the problem brief. Accretion produces
fairly comprehensive artifacts. One of its strengths is that it
is relatively mechanical note taking. This makes it easy to
coordinate as teamwork. A simple example of accretion is
the list in Fig. 2A, enumerating every fact the team had
identified about all of the POIs for one of crimes.
Filtering is selective adding, and therefore also exclud-
ing of information from an artifact. Filtering abstracts
problem information not only from the context of the
problem documents, but from the context of other facts
judged irrelevant to the purpose of the artifact. Filtering
was relatively more interactive among team members; it
involves negotiation and reaching consensus, and then
monitoring execution. A simple example of filtering is
Fig. 2B, enumerating facts involving only the POIs whose
locations gave them an opportunity to commit the crime.
Table 4 presents an interaction excerpt in which mem-
bers of Team 7 recognize the utility of a filtered list of
suspects as they create and develop the artifact in Fig. 2B.
The Interview Analyst suggests partitioning the list by
crime date and location, and making notes person by
person. Several minutes later, the Web Analyst suggests
that they filter the list, including only likely suspects for
the crime. The result is a less rich, but more refined
problem representation.
The fundamental tradeoff between accretion and filter-
ing is that accretion is relatively easy to manage and
produces authoritative artifacts, in the sense that they
are complete representations of the problem data. How-
ever, accretion can also produce cluttered displays that are
difficult to use. Filtering produces representations that are
specially suited to particular issues; artifacts that are
simpler and easier to read. Filtering can simplify decision
making to a merely perceptual task. Thus, the table in
Fig. 2C allows one to see at a glance that several people
Table 4
Interaction excerpt: team 7 recognizing the utility of a filtered list of suspects.
Web Analyst: (Creation of artifact in Fig. 2B) I think it'd be easier if we had a list that we can look at, at each others' stuff, if we had like one list with
different suspects and then we can talk about like…
Interview Analyst: Yeah let's just divide that paper by the date of the crime and the place, and write down notes for the person and stuff.
Records Analyst: For each person?
Interview Analyst: Yeah
(Participants continue to share info for 3.23 min until Web Analyst suggests modifying rules for the artifact.)
Interview Analyst: Bob has an internship in DC, and he's been there since August 19th
Web Analyst: So he's not like a suspect for this one. Maybe we should just keep suspects in this stack. You know what I mean?
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teamwork involved in making filtering decisions about
what information is relevant, given a filtering strategy,
appeared to be engaging to team members. It evoked
discussions creating further cognitive retrieval cues for
subsequently using the artifact, as illustrated in Table 4.
However, constructing a filtered artifact is more difficult,
since judgments about information to include or exclude
must be made; indeed, it is not just that the team can
become more engaged, but also that the team must be
more engaged for filtering to succeed. Finally, filtering
raises the possibility of errors that might be hard to
recover from, for example, if a relevant piece of informa-
tion is accidentally excluded in creating a filtered artifact.
Although accretion and filtering are distinguishable
strategies, they were rarely used monolithically. Through
the course of developing and using artifacts, teams could
use both strategies. We classified artifacts as to their
primary strategy: recording all shared information versus
actively deciding to include/not include shared informa-
tion. For example, the raw list of Fig. 2A is filtered in the
sense that it includes only facts relevant to one of the four
crimes. However, the team directed most of their interac-
tion regarding this artifact amassing all information about
that crime date, rather than actively evaluating informa-
tion, based on opportunity or other filtering criteria.
Most artifacts could be classified with respect to
primary strategy, but some could not. For example, the
graphical representation in Fig. 5, as described above, was
initially pursued as a comprehensive representational
framework for accretion of all the schedule information
presented in Phase III. This artifact is relatively sophisti-
cated, but the original goal was to comprehensively
aggregate problem information. However, the team even-
tually recognized that they did not really need a compre-
hensive representation, that they could exclude schedule
information that did not comprise an overlap with the
schedule of the potential victim. At that point, they
switched to a filtering strategy, evaluating each piece of
information they subsequently included. Accordingly, we
classified this artifact as “major strategy not clear.”
We analyzed 54% (19/35) of the artifacts as primarily
implementing an information accretion strategy, and 31%
(11/35) as primarily implementing a filtering strategy. For
five of the artifacts (14%), we were unable to categorize the
primary strategy as being one or the other (“major strategy
not clear”).
Most of the artifacts teams created were directly ground-
ed in the problem documents, even if this grounding was
actively modulated by a filtering strategy. However a fewartifacts appeared to be derived from other artifacts. For
example, team 21 created a list identifying all of the
suspects for each crime date, distinguishing crime dates
with a unique color coding. The team later created a
successor artifact from this list: the graphical representa-
tion in Fig. 4. This heavily annotated map replicated some
of the information from the prior list artifact, and reused
the color-coding idea, but specifically helped the team to
visualize where POIs were with respect to the crime
scenes.
10. Coordinating artifacts
Thus far we have primarily focused on the develop-
ment and use of separate artifacts, but most of our teams
developed multiple shared artifacts. These artifacts often
emphasized complementary aspects of the information
space, illustrating a higher-order filtering strategy in which
the filtering was coordinated across a collection of arti-
facts. Sets of complementary artifacts often were used
together. We analyzed use of 63% (22/35) of the team
artifacts as coordinated with other artifacts.
Lists of information were often used with other forms
of representations such as tables or diagrams. Team 2
created an exhaustive alphabetical list of all the POIs. They
used this artifact primarily to structure their consideration
of information with respect to POIs. They referred to the
list to help keep team discussion focused on a particular
POI, and then successively moved down the list to ensure
that they systematically considered everyone. When a
teammate moved on prematurely or digressed, the team
member in front of the artifact would point to the list or
refer to where they were in the list to refocus the
discussion.
Fig. 6 depicts the coordinated use of four artifacts (A1,
A2, A3, and A4) during a 3-min segment of interaction
focused on the second crime (towards the end of Phase II).
In the figure, red circles are used to emphasize information
in an artifact that the team seems to be discussing. The
team considered a suspect, Isabel. Using the table A1, they
recognized that they had eliminated Isabel for all the
crimes, based on opportunity. The Web Analyst reminds
them of the possibility that Isabel facilitated the crime, and
they examine the relationship diagram A2, to see who was
connected to Isabel (“Isabel” is in the intersection area of
the two red circles). They identified Sean, her brother, and
Luke, a friend. They then examined the table A3, observing
that Sean had a question mark for crime 2, indicating
possible opportunity to commit the crime (he was sched-
uled to be swimming at a location near the crime scene).
Fig. 6. Example of how artifacts were used together by teams. In turn 3, REC references Isabel from A1. WEB and INT refer to (different parts of) A2 in turns
7–8. In turns 9 and 13 REC refers to A3 and then A4. INT subsequently refers back to A2. And so on. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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table A4 in yellow. The discussion then turned to Luke as a
suspect, noting that Luke owed money to Isabel, but also
noting that Luke has not been included in the prime
suspect table A4. The team eventually concluded that Sean
was the thief and Isabel the instigator. The video showed
them writing over the original claim (recorded in yellow)
in black ink “sold via Isabel” (see Fig. 6).Prior to the episode in Fig. 6, team 2 had developed a
variety of artifacts to summarize and analyze aspects of
the problem information. The team created elimination
tables, A1 and A3, indicating judgments about who had
opportunity to commit each of the four crimes. Based on
these artifacts, they decided to create the social network
diagram A2 to analyze relationships among those POIs
who had opportunity. A1, A2 and A3, as described in Fig. 6,
Table 5
Artifact categories and practices for high and low performing teams.
High
performing
teams
Low
performing
teams
Categories Text annotation 1 1
Calendar annotation 1 1
Map/geo-spatial
annotation
0 1
List 6 9
Table 3 7
Graphical
representation
2 3
Strategies Accretion strategy 4 15
Filtering strategy 6 5
Major strategy not
clear
3 2
Coordinated use 9 13
Total 13 22
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cells of which include a variety of facts and deductions
about possible accomplices. This example illustrates the
strategies discussed above: The elimination tables use
accretion in comprehensively enumerating all POIs, but
also filtering, in their focus on opportunity. The relation-
ship diagram is a filtered successor artifact in focusing on
connections among POIs who had been judged to have
opportunity. The prime suspects table is further filtered to
enumerate only the most likely suspects. The interaction
depicted in the episode shows how the team coordinated
all four artifacts in developing the analysis.
Although this was a good example of sophisticated
development and use of artifacts, the team actually made
an incorrect analysis, even though all the necessary
information was contained in artifacts A2 and A3. In
assessing Luke and Isabel's social connections in the
relationship diagram A2, they overlooked his connection
to Tay (“Tay” is underlined in blue in A2). Tay and Luke had
a history of stealing together (the label on their shared link
in A2), and Tay was available at the time of the crime (A3).
After the Phase II, when the received updated information,
they wrote the correct answer in red ink in the prime
suspects table (A4), flagging Isabel and Luke as instigators,
in the cell corresponding to Tay and crime 2.11. Interactions with team performance
In order to articulate performance-related phenomena
we selected five consistently high performing team and
five consistently low performing teams for microanalysis.
High performing teams created fewer information arti-
facts, 13/35 or 37% of the total (mean¼2.6 artifacts per
team) than did low performing teams (22/35; mean¼4.4)
across the three phases, Table 5. Thus, the sheer number of
artifacts created does not appear to be a marker or enabler
of better team performance.
High performing teams also did not differ much from
low performing teams with respect to the specific types of
artifacts they created; Table 5 summarizes frequencies
across categories of artifacts created. About 38% (5/13) of
the artifacts created by high performing teams were
relatively complex (tables and graphical representations;
see Sections 5 and 6); for low performing teams this
proportion was 45% (10/22). Thus, the complexity of
artifacts created does not appear to be associated with
better team performance.
About 31% (4/13) of the artifacts created by high
performing teams were used primarily for information
accretion, as discussed in Section 9, and 46% (6/13) were
primarily used for information filtering; for low perform-
ing teams these proportions strongly reversed: 68% (15/
22) were accretion, and 23% (5/22) were filtering (for 5
cases it was not clear what the preponderant strategy
was). Based on analysis of videos and transcripts, we
classified 69% (9/13) of the artifacts created by high-
performing teams as being as coordinated with other
artifacts (see Section 10); 59% (13/22) of the artifacts
created by low-performing teams were analyzed as having
been coordinated in use with other artifacts. Both of thesepatterns suggest that high performing teams adopted
more efficient and sophisticated strategies, actively filter-
ing information they inscribed in artifacts, and coordinat-
ing their use of multiple artifacts, though with the small
number of teams that were assessed in detail, this is a just
a statistically descriptive result.
In general, teams were quite bottom-up/opportunistic
in creating artifacts. They tended to sketch and prototype
artifacts designs, without fully planning or specifying in
advance how the artifacts would be used. Two teams were
exceptions to this (2 and 13), each had one member who
was distinctively concerned with problem decomposition
from early in the session. These two teams were also the
two highest performing teams. This suggests that the basis
for high performance might reside in avoiding premature
commitment and analogous consequences of insufficient
analysis and reflection [29]. Early top-down analysis is also
consistent with creating fewer artifacts overall.
Individuals can make a huge different in the perfor-
mance of 3-person teams. Our single highest performing
team (team 2) created well-organized, complex artifacts
primarily designed by one member, including all of the
artifacts described in Fig. 6. Only one of their artifacts
(depicted in Fig. 5) was created through collaborative
effort, though, perhaps notably, that artifact was the final
artifact they designed and arguably was the most sophis-
ticated design the team produced.
Of course, we cannot know whether the high perform-
ing teams were high performing because they created
more filtered artifacts that they also effectively coordi-
nated in use, or whether they created more filtered
artifacts and coordinated use because they included mem-
bers with better problem-solving skills (that is, because
they were high-performing). It could even be that our high
performing teams succeeded more because they (perhaps
fortuitously) created better artifacts earlier on in their
problem solving, and thus escaped being caught up in
Table 6
Requirements for interactive visual computing tools and environments to support information analysis.
Task orientation and awareness: Users should be incidentally guided and reminded of first-order task structures and strategies and of resources,
contributions and activity of their teammates by the visual presentation of and interaction with tools and materials
Individual annotations: Users should be able to annotate problem documents directly, and easily create (temporary) personal artifacts (such as simple
lists)
Individual and team views: Users should be able to share annotations and other artifacts with team members, but should have control over what
is shared
Grounding analyses: Users should be able to reinstate the original context of an annotation (that is, they should be able to see the entire object,
e.g., document, part of which was annotated)
Successor artifacts: Users should be able to directly edit and further refine an artifact into a successor artifact
Coordinating multiple artifacts: Users should be able to refer to multiple (complementary) artifacts simultaneously
Artifact operations: Users should be able to combine artifact features into filtered views and custom views (they should be able to filter annotations in a
map by their date attribute, embed a map in a calendar day view cell, etc)
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unintegrated artifacts, and thereby eventually experien-
cing poorer outcomes.12. Implications for design
Complex cognitive and collaborative activities are often
achieved through artifacts and artifact-centered practices.
Chin et al. [14] study of five information analysts empha-
sized their use of annotation and representation in orga-
nizing their data to search for patterns, their strongly held
attitudes about the diversity of representations used, and
the unmet need for information analysis tool support.
We found that participants created a variety of artifacts
that they used as external cognitive aids. Individual
artifacts tended to be simple in structure, mostly direct
annotations on problem documents and lists. Teams also
created and used artifacts to support collective cognition,
that is, to orient and mediate problem solving interactions
among team members. Team artifacts tended to be some-
what more refined and complex, for example, including
tables and graphical representations.
We analyzed the kinds of artifacts participants sponta-
neously created, and the ways they used these artifacts.
We found that both individual and team artifacts often
originate in the spontaneous and iterative tinkering of a
single team member. Nevertheless, the team artifacts
sometimes become quite articulated, and were used as
special purpose tools, closely coordinated with other
artifacts (as in Fig. 6). We distinguished information
accretion and information filtering in artifact practices,
and design of artifacts as successors to prior artifacts.
Although our study was qualitative, we also found sugges-
tions that better integrated artifacts and artifact practices
were associated with better team performance in our
model task.
Our primary purpose in this study was to observe and
analyze team performance in information analysis activity
supported by non-interactive technologies in order to
identify requirements and design ideas for collaborative
systems to support such activity. In Table 6, we identify
seven design requirements for interactive visual computing
tools and environments suggested by this analysis of the use
of cognitive artifacts in information analysis activity. Theseseven requirements are a design-oriented view of our
results; we discuss each in turn.
Information analysis activity is complex, collaborative
problem solving. It involves developing and maintaining
an orienting model of the task (task orientation; [11]), and
awareness of team status and strategy with respect to the
activity (activity awareness; [10]). The information space
our participants analyzed – 222 propositions –was modest
relative to the real-world, but large enough to challenge
teams, particularly given the time pressure in our study. In
our problem context, task orientation includes conceptua-
lizing an overall event timeline and geo-spatial frame, and
identifying and systematically pursuing strategies such as
successive elimination of POIs from consideration. Our
teams all did this to some extent, but even the most
successful teams directed little specific effort toward such
meta-cognitive objectives. In our problem context, activity
awareness is keeping track of active team strategies, of
what each member can contribute (with respect to role
information, but also with respect to insights and perspec-
tives shared in the teamwork to that point), and of what
each member is doing currently with respect to active
strategies and relevant problem information. Again, our
teams did this to some extent, but they did not direct
effort to it specifically, and they often did it poorly. (See
also [3].)
Human problem solvers characteristically act before
they have fully analyzed a problematic situation; indeed,
professional problem solving involves a constant self-
monitoring to achieve reflection-in-action (e.g., [29]).
Getting adults to be more meta-cognitive by directly
instructing them to do so is not an effective design inter-
vention (e.g., [11]). A more promising direction, and one
quite typical of HCI design work, is to con-
figure interactive environments so that users incidentally
encounter and are continuingly reminded of high-order
problem information in the course of thinking about and
acting on immediate and lower level issues. Thus, structur-
ing an interactive environment to build an index of user
annotations with respect to POIs, place names, dates, etc.
that can be viewed as a list or table, and to provide
timeline and map widgets which can be populated
with event information that has been annotated might
help users develop and maintain a more comprehensive
orienting model of the information analysis task. Analo-
gously, keeping track of which team member (that is,
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for example by color-coding, would support activity
awareness. For an interactive system to support distribu-
ted collaborations, color-coding could also be employed to
organize buddy lists and chats. The more pervasively we
can exploit such a mechanism, the more effectively we can
maintain awareness of what partners know and can
contribute to teamwork, and what they have already
contributed and currently doing with respect to collective
strategies.
Our participants spent substantial time and effort creat-
ing a wide variety of artifacts to externalize and support their
team cognition. Although Chin et al. [14] study of profes-
sional information analysis was smaller scale and less
analytic with specific regard to the creation and use of
artifacts, they indicate also that artifacts were spontaneously
created. This suggests that interactive tool support for
information analysis activity should provide templates for
cognitive artifacts, or toolkits to create such artifacts. This
requirement could of course be realized in many different
ways. For example, users could annotate problem documents
directly, writing an annotation layer onto document objects,
and extracting key content from the annotated data (person
names, date, places). Users could be provided with editors to
create simple lists and tables.
Although our study data did not capture much detail
regarding individual artifact processes, all but one of our
30 participants created individual artifacts, an average of
almost 4 per person in the experimental session. More-
over, we observed that team artifacts often originate in the
initiative of a single team member. This suggests that
supporting easy personal artifact creation/instantiation, a
wide range of artifact types, and a mechanism to share
artifacts with team members would support and encou-
rage the activities we observed, and perhaps improve
them by making sharing an explicit decision. In prior work
on collaborative support for emergency management
planning, we found that supporting an articulation of
public and private views, and making sharing an explicit
action facilitated developing an understanding of what
other team members knew, and of what information
would be useful to share with them; this was manifest,
for example, in a strategy shift from asking fellow team
members to share information to recognizing what part-
ners were interested in and pushing that specific informa-
tion to them, a relatively high level of activity awareness
among team members [18].
We think that the relatively large number of personal
artifacts created in our information analysis activity is a
potential resource to the team-level activity, and that its
utility could be enhanced if the interactive environment
can effectively support and encourage sharing of personal
artifacts. One way to realize this is through implementing
personal and team views of the problem space, as was
done by Convertino et al. [18] in the emergency manage-
ment planning domain.
We identified a tension between generalization and
grounding. In our study, and in Chin et al. [14] prior study,
relatively refined and better integrated artifacts that fil-
tered information and provided specialized views were
useful to teams, and associated with better performance.However, it was also important to be able to track back
from an artifact to the raw data it codified. This require-
ment is particularly difficult to support with non-inter-
active, paper-based artifacts, as in our study and that of
Chin et al. [14]. However, linking data representations is
one of the primary strengths of interactive systems. We
think would be useful to maintain a pointer to original
problem document context and allow users to directly
access that context from any fact inscribed in an informa-
tion artifact. For example, the user could select “Holly
works @ Starbucks” in Fig. 2A, or the blue line segment
labeled REC in the column labeled THURS in the graphical
artifact in Fig. 5, and display grounding (presumably a
sentence in one or more problem documents).
This functionality could be facilitated and elaborated by
allowing users to manually add metadata to artifacts as
they are created; for example, indicating social or inten-
tional context beyond what literally appeared in the
problem documents. Thus, a user could record that a fact
was added to an artifact because of a specific suspicion
about a given POI, or over an objection of one team
member, or that a given fact in a given artifact is related
to another fact inscribed in another artifact, etc. (We
acknowledge that creating manual metadata is an example
of the kind of meta-cognitive activity people rarely
engage in.)
We observed attempts to evolve artifacts, sometimes by
merely adding data within a framework, but sometimes
evolving the representational framework of the artifact.
This latter pattern of evolving successor artifacts was not
typical among our teams, but we feel it is significant
because it illustrates creativity and critical thinking.
Furthermore, evolving artifact designs is not easy to do
with physically codified artifacts. One can scribble in an
extra data dimension on a paper artifact (e.g., Fig. 3), but
this increases clutter and makes the design of the artifact
more chaotic. One cannot reuse, adapt, or fundamentally
refactor paper artifacts in the way one easily can digital
artifacts. Therefore, we feel that the context of an inter-
active environment for supporting information analysis
also provides a much better opportunity to support sig-
nificant artifact redesign.
In several quite successful episodes in our study, we
observed teams coordinating multiple specialized artifacts
(Fig. 6). Indeed, were we to better support the creation of
relatively refined and better-integrated artifacts that filter
data and provide specialized views of the problem data,
we might expect to see more interest in coordinating
multiple specialized artifacts. Again, this is a particular
strength of interactive systems, where multiple coordi-
nated views of an underlying data structure or process are
often used to facilitate comprehension and design [7].
Computational approaches to supporting collaborative
information analysis have investigated specific utilities of
representing underlying data entities, which may be
visualized in multiple ways [2,30].
To some extent, our participants needed to create
specialized artifacts because the artifacts they could create
– out of paper, post-its, and other basic physical materials
– were not capable of interaction. Thus, in Fig. 6 there are
two kinds of tables being used by the team, but they have
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consider that these artifacts could be different views or
states of a single interactive artifact. Similarly, we men-
tioned that the graphical representation in Fig. 4 was
derived from a prior artifact, a table. In an interactive
system context, we might consider that the table and the
graphical representation could be two views of a single
underlying data structure. Thus, besides supporting easier
creation of specialized artifacts per se, we think it would
be useful to provide artifacts with editable views, allowing
any given information artifact to a have variety of
specialized views.
Drawing implications for design directly from the study of
human activities is not straightforward. Key characteristics of
human activity co-evolve with the technologies, tools and
environments that support those activities [12]. Historically, it
is typical that the needs and preferences that motivate a
technological innovation are not satisfied tout court by that
innovation, but rather transformed into new needs and
preferences that are just as keenly felt (and which subse-
quently motivate further technology development). We are
also mindful of those notable cases where the best of
intentions have led technologists to over-support apparent
inefficiency that was in fact well-adapted vagueness, to no
one's benefit [32]. This is not to argue against taking human
activity seriously in informing technology design; it is just to
put it in the larger and sobering context of history.
More generally, identifying requirements per se is always
highly under-constrained. In practice, when requirements are
specified and realized in software and in user interaction,
given sets of requirements are found to be mutually incon-
sistent or contradictory, and/or to allow, imply, or even
necessitate further requirements. This is the basis for Brooks'
well-known argument for the necessity of prototyping ([4]; cf.
[8]). Again, this is not to impugn requirements identification
and analysis as a key activity in upstream design, it is just to
put it in context. The requirements identified constitute a rich
design agenda for supporting information analysis with inter-
active tools. We are currently prototyping embodiments of
these requirements. Our approach to this is to selectively
respond to, realize, and assess requirements enumerated
above, not assuming that in the end we will implement
everything, or necessarily implement anything just as
envisioned above.Acknowledgments
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